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Stemming from a property dispute between a private landowner 
and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, this action evolved into a debate 
concerning the scope of tribal sovereign immunity and whether Indian 
tribes should be bound by certain common law doctrines applicable to 
most other sovereigns. The Washington Supreme Court originally ruled 
against the Tribe, citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Nation in holding that sovereign immunity does not 
apply to in rem actions. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to clarify that its ruling in Yakima did not support such a 
proposition. The case grew in significance on appeal, when the respondent 
landowners asserted an alternative argument based on the immovable 
property exception to sovereign immunity. While case law clarified that 
exception in the context of traditional sovereigns, none explored its 
applicability to tribes. Recognizing the novelty of the argument and its 
potentially sweeping consequences, the Court remanded the question to 
the Washington Supreme Court, prompting a spirited dissent accusing the 
majority of abdicating its judicial duties. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) purchased 
roughly 40 acres of land in an effort to expand its reservation.1 A 
subsequent survey revealed a border discrepancy with neighbors Sharline 
and Ray Lundgren.2 The Lundgrens filed a quiet title action in Washington 
state court against the Tribe, to which the Tribe asserted the defense of 
tribal sovereign immunity.3 The Washington Supreme Court ruled against 
the Tribe, relying on County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of Yakima Nation to hold that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a 
state court from asserting jurisdiction over in rem actions against a tribe.4 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, clarifying that 
Yakima did not address the scope of sovereign immunity, but rather 
interpreted a “relic of a statute” involving the Indian General Allotment 
Act of 1887.5 Additionally, the Court discussed an alternative argument 
presented by the Lundgrens late in the case proposing that the immovable 
                                                     
1.  Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1652 (2018). 
2.  Id.   
3.  Id.  
4.  Id. (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)). 
5.  Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1652-23 (See Indian General Allotment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 40-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1877) (codified as 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 331-358 (2012)) (authorizing the President to allot reservation 
lands and issue fee patents to individual allottees). 
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property exception to sovereign immunity should apply to tribes.6 Noting 
the late appearance of the argument and the sweeping consequences of 
applying the immovable property doctrine to tribes for the first time, the 
Court remanded the case to the Washington Supreme Court for further 
consideration.7 That decision prompted a concurrence raising concerns 
over the Lundgrens’ potential lack of recourse, as well as a dissent 
criticizing the majority’s inaction.8  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Tribe consists of descendants from 10 Indian villages 
historically located along the Skagit and Sauk Rivers in Northwest 
Washington.9 In 1855, leaders from those villages and numerous other 
tribes in the region ceded their land to the United States through the Treaty 
of Point Elliot in exchange for money and other assurances.10 While the 
treaty established several joint reservations for the various tribes to 
occupy, the residents of the 10 villages were not considered a cohesive 
group and therefore did not receive land of their own.11 The Tribe gained 
federal recognition in the early 1970’s, but remained landless until the 
1981 establishment of a 99-acre reservation.12 In 2013, as part of an effort 
to recover lost territory, the Tribe purchased a 40-acre parcel of land 
bordering the reservation.13  
Intending to place the land into trust, the Tribe conducted a formal 
survey which revealed the border discrepancy underlying this case. A 
misplaced fence erroneously marked the northern boundary of the parcel, 
leaving a one-acre strip of the Tribe’s newly purchased land on the side 
originally thought owned by their neighbors, Sharline and Ray 
Lundgren.14  
The Tribe notified the Lundgrens that it planned to clear-cut the 
disputed tract of land and reposition the fence, prompting the Lundgrens 
to file a quiet title action in Washington state court. The Lundgrens 
                                                     
6.  Id.  
7. Id. at 1654. 
8. Id. at 1655-63.  
9.  Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board, Upper Skagit Tribe, 
NPAIHB, http://www.npaihb.org/member-tribes/upper-skagit-tribe/ 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
10.  Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1651; Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 
1855, 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Treaty].  
11. Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board, Upper Skagit Tribe, 
NPAIHB, http://www.npaihb.org/member-tribes/upper-skagit-tribe/ 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
12.  Brief for Petitioner at 6, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 
S. Ct. 1649 (2018); Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board, 
Upper Skagit Tribe, NPAIHB, http://www.npaihb.org/member-
tribes/upper-skagit-tribe/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).  
13.  Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1652. 
14.  Brief for Petitioner at 7, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren,138 
S. Ct.  1649 (2018). 
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asserted claim to the land under the doctrines of adverse possession and 
mutual acquiescence.15 In defense, the Tribe asserted sovereign immunity 
and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion 
and granted summary judgment for the Lundgrens.16  
The Tribe appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, which 
granted review.17 Relying primarily on Yakima, the Washington Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that sovereign immunity 
did not bar a state judge from deciding in rem actions against a tribe.18 The 
court reasoned that because the Lundgren’s quiet title action did not 
deprive the Tribe of any land it rightly owned, deciding such an action 
would not constitute an impermissible violation of tribal sovereignty.19  
The Tribe appealed once more, and the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to clarify confusion surrounding its holding in 
Yakima.20 On appeal, however, the Lundgrens asserted an alternative 
argument not discussed at earlier stages in the case. In their response brief, 
the Lundgrens urged the Court to affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s 
ruling based on the immovable property exception to sovereign immunity, 
which had never previously been applied to tribes.21 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In its analysis, the Court first addressed whether tribal sovereign 
immunity applies to in rem lawsuits, before discussing whether the 
immovable property exception to sovereign immunity should apply to 
tribes.  
 
A. In Rem Bar to Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
 
The Court quickly refuted the Washington Supreme Court’s 
reading of Yakima, noting that the case in no way limited the scope of 
tribal sovereign immunity.22 Instead, the Court explained that Yakima 
concerned the ability of states to tax certain land within a reservation with 
respect to antiquated provisions contained within the Indian General 
Allotment Act of 1877.23  
To explain the misinterpretation of Yakima, the Court provided a 
brief review of the historical circumstances that created the complicated 
                                                     
15. Id. 
16.  Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 8, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 
138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018). 
17.  Brief for Petitioner at 8, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 
S. Ct. 1649 (2018). 
18. Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1652. 
19. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 
S. Ct. 1649 (2018). 
20. Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1651. 
21.  Id. at 1653-54.  
22.  Id. at 1652. 
23.  Id. (See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012)).  
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land-ownership schemes on reservations.24 Decades of federal policy 
designed to dissolve reservations, followed by the 1934 Indian 
Reorganization Act’s about face on that topic, resulted in the 
checkerboarding of reservations, with tracts of private, fee-patented land 
interspersed among trust land held for tribes.25  
 Yakima attempted to resolve conflicting statutory and judicial 
directives concerning what types of taxes states could levy on fee-patented 
land within reservations.26 Although the General Allotment Act subjected 
allottees and their fee-patented land to state taxes and regulations, the 
Court later ruled in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of 
Flathead Reservation that the act should no longer be read to allow a state 
to impose in personam taxes on transactions between Indians on fee land 
within a reservation as a matter of impracticability.27 In Yakima, the Court 
distinguished its holding in Moe, ruling that collecting in rem taxes on fee 
patented land within a reservation was not too burdensome and still 
permitted under the act.28  
Thus, the Court explained that Yakima did not concern the scope 
of tribal sovereign immunity, but rather interpreted a “relic of statute in 
light of a distinguishable precedent.”29 As it stands, the in rem nature of a 
suit does not by itself preclude a tribe from asserting the defense of 
sovereign immunity.30  
 
B. Immovable Property Exception 
 
The Court then addressed the Lundgren’s alternative argument 
presented in their response brief and at oral argument. Rather than 
requesting affirmation of the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling based 
on Yakima, the Lundgren’s appeal asserted that the Tribe could not claim 
sovereign immunity due to the historical doctrine known as the immovable 
property exception.31 That doctrine is based on the longstanding rule that 
a prince who purchases property within a foreign country relinquishes his 
privilege and assumes the role of a private individual.32 Accordingly, the 
Lundgrens argued that the Tribe qualified as foreign sovereign which 
purchased land within the State of Washington, making it therefore subject 
to the host sovereign’s rules and regulations.33 The Lundgrens further 
argued that the immovable property exception had applied to nearly all 
                                                     
24. Id. at 1652-53.  
25.  Id.  
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. (See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976)).  
28. Id. (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 265 (1992)). 
29.  Id.  
30.  Id. at 1653. 
31.  Id.  
32. Id. at 1654. 
33. Id.  
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sovereigns throughout history, and excluding tribes from the list would 
afford them a sort of “super-sovereign” immunity.34  
The Tribe and the United States, on the other hand, maintained 
that Indian tribes enjoy a unique form of sovereignty to which historical 
and wide-sweeping doctrines do not always neatly apply.35 Additionally, 
the Tribe and United States argued that since inception, the political 
branches, rather than the judiciary, have been considered the proper venue 
for determining whether foreign sovereigns “may be sued for their 
activities in this country.”36 
The Court noted the novelty and potential gravity of the 
Lundgrens’ argument.37 Of particular import, the Court had never 
discussed the immovable property exception in relation to tribal sovereign 
immunity. Moreover, the argument emerged late in the case, after the 
Tribe and many of its “amici had their say.”38 While this procedural 
posture does not prevent a court from addressing an argument, the Court 
nevertheless determined “restraint [was] the best use of discretion.”39 
Calling proposed limits to tribal sovereign immunity a “grave question,” 
the Court recognized that ruling on the immovable property exception in 
this case would affect all tribes, not just the Upper Skagit.38 With these 
concerns in mind, the Court remanded the case to the Washington 
Supreme Court to resolve the immovable property exception argument at 
first instance.40  
Finally, the Court justified its decision to remand in anticipation 
of a critical dissent, stating that it had not shirked its duty by declining to 
answer what some might consider a straightforward question.41 The Court 
countered that if the question was truly so simple, the Washington state 
justices should have no problem answering it themselves.42 The Court also 
noted that its decision resolved the initial question of whether tribal 
sovereign immunity applies to in rem actions. “That is work enough for 




Justices Roberts and Kennedy agreed with the majority’s 
decision to “forgo consideration” of the immovable property exception; 
however, they expressed concern over the Lundgren’s lack of recourse 
                                                     
34.  Brief for Respondents at 27, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 
138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018) (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 466 (1995)).  
35.  Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1654. 
36. Id.  
37.  Id.  
38.  Id.  
39. Id. 
38. Id. 
40. Id.  
41.  Id.  
42.  Id.  
43. Id. at 1654-55. 
6 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
should that rule not be extended to tribes.44 The Justices called for a 
method of resolving “mundane dispute[s] over property ownership” with 
tribes.45 If tribes were to “always win[ ]” based on sovereign immunity, 
Justices Roberts and Kennedy warned, the doctrine could become a 
mechanism to “seize property with impunity, even without a colorable 
claim of right.”46  
Additionally, the concurrence took issue with the Solicitor 
General’s suggestion that the Lundgrens take measures to “induce [the 
Tribe] to file a quiet-title action,” therefore waiving its sovereign 
immunity.47 While cutting trees or building a structure on the disputed 
property “may well have the desired effect,” the Justices expressed 
skepticism that “the law requires private individuals . . . to pick a fight in 
order to vindicate their interests.”48 In conclusion, the Justices 
recommended the Lundgrens “examine the full range of legal options . . .  




Dissenting Justices Thomas and Alito criticized the majority for 
not ruling on application of the immovable property exception to tribes.50 
To that end, the Justices engaged in their own analysis of the question they 
deemed “grave,” yet “also clear.”51 
First, the dissent noted that the immovable property exception is 
“hornbook law” and predates the founding of the United States and its 
subsequent treaties with tribes.52 The rule mirrors the ancient principle of 
lex rei sitae, meaning “land is governed by the law of the place where it is 
situated.”53 Citing scholarly works dating to the 16th century as well as the 
Court’s own cases, the dissent illustrated “six centuries of consensus” 
supporting the doctrine’s validity.54 
After highlighting broad acceptance of the immovable property 
exception, the dissent concluded that it should undoubtedly apply to 
tribes.55 Justices Thomas and Alito noted the Court’s recent refusal to grant 
tribes anything “beyond what common-law sovereign immunity principles 
would recognize.”56 The Justices then characterized tribal sovereign 
                                                     
44. Id. at 1655-56.  
45. Id. at 1655. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 23–24, Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018)). 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 1656.  
50.  Id. 
44. Id. at 1657. 
52.  Id. at 1658. 
53.  Id. (citing F. WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273, 607 (3rd 
ed. 1905)).  
54. Id. at 1658-61. 
55. Id. at 1661. 
56. Id. (citing Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1292 (2017)). 
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immunity as a judicial construct unwarranted under the Constitution.57 
Indeed, per the dissent, the founding fathers would likely be “shocked” to 
learn an Indian tribe could claim immunity from a suit like the 
Lundgrens’.58  
Justices Thomas and Alito also used the dissent to discount 
arguments cited by the majority against applying the immovable property 
exception to tribes, deeming them inconclusive and distinguishable from 
case law.59 Finally, the dissenting Justices warned that the Tribe is 
asserting a “sweeping and absolute immunity that no other sovereign has 
ever enjoyed.”60 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision is significant primarily for what it did not 
do. By rejecting the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Yakima, the Court left intact a tribe’s potential defense of sovereign 
immunity against in rem claims. Moreover, the Court’s decision to remand 
the immovable property exception to the Washington Supreme Court will 
allow for a more thorough analysis of a novel and potentially sweeping 
proposition. While the dissent accused the majority of abdicating its 
judicial duties, the decision to remand suggests a reluctance to issue a 
hasty ruling on a “grave question” only raised at the tail end of 
proceedings.  
                                                     
57. Id. at 1662 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998)).  
58. Id.  
59.  Id. at 1661-62.  
60.  Id. at 1663.  
